We report a laboratory experiment that investigates the impact of passive participation on bubble formation in asset markets with inexperienced and experienced traders. Some treatments employ pre-market training in which each participant is 'matched' with a trader from a different prior market and observes all trading details but does not directly participate in trading. We find that passive participation, similar to direct experience, significantly reduces mispricing in subsequent markets. This finding suggests that observation of prices is a key mechanism through which experience mitigates bubbles. We also vary whether transaction prices are displayed in a column of text or in a graphical display, and find that among inexperienced and once-experienced traders, markets with the tabular display result in bubbles that are greater in amplitude relative to markets with the graphical display.
Introduction
Asset markets throughout history have experienced episodes with prices that increase above fundamental value, followed by a rapid drop. This is often referred to as a 'bubble' and 'crash'. Examples range from the Dutch Tulip craze of the 1600s, to the recent worldwide housing bubble of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Rational expectations models predict that common expectations about the value of the asset should never result in bubbles (Tirole, 1982 ), yet bubbles have formed even with commonly-known intrinsic values assigned in laboratory experiments (Porter and Smith, 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2013; Palan, 2013) .
A rich literature has investigated behavioral causes of the 'irrational' overbidding that drives up transaction prices in asset markets. Speculation is one rational reason for bubble formation, yet bubbles are still observed in a market where resale (and thus speculation) is not possible (Lei et al., 2001) . One of the most robust results in the asset market bubble literature is the effect of experience, defined as previous participation in a similar laboratory asset market, on reducing bubbles (Xia and Zhang, 2012; Haruvy et al., 2007; Dufwenberg et al., 2005; Smith et al. 1988 ; Van Boening et al., 1993; King et al., 1993) .
1 However, experience in one market does not reliably transfer to another, and bubbles may re-emerge after changes to market parameters (Hussam et al., 2008) .
Despite research focused on the role of experience in abating bubbles, the mechanisms through which experience functions are not well understood. This paper investigates whether passive participation, rather than experience (i.e., active participation), is sufficient to reduce asset market bubbles. Passive participants observe the same information as a prior trader, and receive the same payoffs, but do not actively make decisions. Passive participation is similar to 1 We use the term "bubble" throughout this paper to refer to mispricing generally, as defined by King et al. (1993) : "trade in high volume at prices that are considerably at variance from intrinsic value" (page 183).
observational learning, in which participants observe an active participant but do not otherwise participate. Observational learning has shown to improve decision-making in a variety of economic games (Merlo and Schotter, 2003; Kocher et al., 2015) . Different from observational learning, our comparisons of passive participation and active participation allow us to carefully isolate the act of making decisions from all other aspects of the environment. Thus, we can explore whether the act of making a decision is integral to the effectiveness of direct and participatory experience at mitigating bubbles.
Specifically, the experiment employs treatments that feature pre-market training in which each participant is 'matched' with a trader from a different prior market and observes all trading details but does not directly participate. Related work has studied overlapping generations of traders, but has not isolated the impact of passive participation (Deck et al., 2014; Xie and Zhang, 2012; Alevy and Price, 2012) . 2 Huber et al. (2014) found that experience gained in a laboratory investment game increased pricing efficiency in subsequent asset markets.
One leading explanation of asset market bubbles is trader confusion Kirchler et al., 2012) . Confusion seems to be reduced when fundamental values are displayed in graphical form Baghstanian and Walker, 2014) , when the asset is framed differently (such as a 'depletable gold mine, , or through pre-market training about dividend payments (Lei and Vesely, 2009) . 3 To investigate how confusion may interact with passive and active participation, the experiment also varies whether continuously-updated transaction prices are displayed in a column of text or in a visual information display. If confusion about the relationship of prices to asset fundamental values is a 2 Overlapping generations of traders introduce new injections of cash, which is known to promote bubbles, so that it is not possible to disentangle the role of information alone. Alevy and Price (2012) come closest to disentangling the role of observational learning, but do not directly identify it because of the addition of advice in their design. 3 Related work also explores impact on bubble formation of the pattern of market fundamentals (Noussair and Powell, 2010; Stöckl et al., 2014) and the impact of training (Cheung et al., 2014) .
reason for bubble formation, increased understanding provided by visual representation may reduce mispricing. While some previous studies have displayed prices graphically (e.g., Deck et al., 2014; Kirchler et al., 2012) , none have systematically varied information display to determine its influence on subsequent pricing.
We find that passive participation, similar to experience, significantly reduces mispricing in subsequent markets. This suggests that observation of prices is a key mechanism through which experience mitigates bubbles, and it can substitute for active participation. Among inexperienced and once-experienced traders, markets with a visual representation of trade prices result in bubbles with lower mispricing relative to markets with prices reported in text format.
Experimental Design & Procedures

Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory (Purdue University) using 240 undergraduate student subjects allocated across 12 sessions. Ten participants interacted in each market and were able to trade together for the duration of the experiment. We conducted 2 independent market groups (20 subjects) per experimental session.
Subjects participated in only one session of this study. Upon arriving to the lab, subjects were seated at computers and the experimenter read the instructions out loud while subjects followed along. (See Appendix I for instructions.) Earnings were converted to US dollars at the rate of 150 experimental dollars = $1. Each session lasted approximately two hours and subjects earned an average of about $39 each.
Trading Environment
We use a version of the Smith et al. (1988) trading environment, and a continuous double auction for traders to buy and sell a finitely lived asset that pays a random dividend to all asset holders at the end of each trading period. In this trading institution (programmed in zTree, Fischbacher, 2007) , traders could submit a bid or ask and could accept any other trader's bid or ask in continuous time.
Traders participated in three consecutive markets, each consisting of 12, two-minute trading periods with a hard close. We conducted three markets to observe behavior of traders both before and after they gained experience. Traders knew how many markets would be conducted in their session. Instructions for each market were distributed immediately before that market opened, and earnings were cumulative.
At the beginning of each market, traders were randomly endowed with one of two portfolio types, with half of the market trading group endowed with 3 shares and 1080 in cash and half endowed with 5 shares and 504 in cash. 4 At the end of each period, shares paid a publicly announced dividend, randomly determined and uniformly distributed over the values {0e, 8e, 28e, 60e}. The one period expected value of each share was 24e, so the value of each share at the beginning of the market was 12 ⨯ 24e = 288e. Shares were not redeemable for cash at the end of the market and were not transferable across markets. Therefore, these assets had a commonly known and declining (by 24e each period) fundamental value.
Treatments
The experiment included four treatments shown in Table 1 In the passive participation market, each subject was also paid the same amount as his/her "match". The passive participants also recorded information on record sheets each period. Thus, the only difference in market 1 of Pre-Visualized and Pre-Text treatments compared to
Visualized and Text treatments is that subjects never made their own bids, asks or trades. The remaining two markets (markets 2 and 3) in the Pre-Visualized and Pre-Text treatments were
Visualized and Text markets with normal trading (i.e., active participation), respectively.
Conjectures
Comparisons of Market 1 to Markets 2 and 3 allow us to investigate the role of experience. We also compare Market 2 behavior between Pre-Visualized and Visualized treatments and between Pre-Text and Text treatments to investigate the role of passive participation, as compared to direct experience. We conjecture that exposure to a market will promote learning through observation and decrease the amplitude of price bubbles in subsequent markets, similar to previous findings that indicate experience reduces subsequent bubbles. A possible mechanism for the effect of passive participation is feedback in the observed marketeither through learning about overall price trends or individual learning strategies. Alternative explanations for the effect of passive participation could be the additional time available to think about the decision (without having to act) or the individual payout (that is linked to one's match).
Comparisons of Text-Market 1 and Visualized-Market 1 allow us to investigate the role of graphical representation on behavior of inexperienced traders. If agents are boundedly rational or do not process price information fully (Simon, 1987) , then information that is more easily processed will result in less confusion and a reduction in bubbles. Graphical displays may allow users to 'see' patterns in data (Lurie and Mason, 2007) . Thus, we conjecture that the Visualized market will result in a reduction in bubble formation relative to the Text market. Alternatively, if agents use past prices to form expectations about future prices (Haruvy et al., 2007) , then an improvement in information processing may cause greater salience of a positive price trend, so the Visualized market could result in an increase in bubble formation relative to the Text market.
Results
Treatment Effects
Figure 1 To explore more formally, we conduct statistical tests using the Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) measure of mispricing and valuation (Stöckl et al., 2010 ):
where ! is the volume-weighted mean price in period t, ! is the fundamental value in period t, is the average fundamental value of the market and N is the number of periods in the market. RAD, similar to bubble amplitude, measures absolute "mispricing" in the market. Table 2 provides the RAD for each treatment and market. We observe significantly positive RAD across all markets based on Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. This suggests a substantial level of mispricing, as typically seen in previous studies (e.g., Smith et al., 1988 ).
Our first question concerns the effects of direct experience versus passive participation. As seen in Table 2 , experience and passive participation both decrease RAD in the Visualized and Text markets, but the effect appears to be stronger for experience than for passive participation. Result 2: Among inexperienced and once-experienced traders, visualizing prices in a graph significantly decreases RAD compared to displaying prices in text.
We obtain similar results using an alternate measure of absolute mispricing usually called amplitude (Hussam et al., 2008) ; see Appendix III. No significant differences exist for asset market bubble duration or turnover.
What Mechanisms Drive the Effect of Passive Participation?
A novel feature of this experiment is the random assignment of traders in the passive participation treatments to different experiences, uncorrelated with their own decisions. This allows us to measure the effect of exogenous observed trading histories and price trends on subsequent decision-making. Here we look at individual strategies and session-based learning.
We first classify individual strategies based on traders' propensity to make "safe" trades (buy at prices no higher than or sell at prices no lower than fundamental value) versus "risky" trades (buy above or sell below fundamental value). Traders who make more safe trades earn more in the market overall. Because the severe mispricing of this negative bubble "cancels out" some of the more common positive mispricing, no significant differences exist between the visual and text display for Stöckl et al.'s (2010) other measure that reflects average (signed) price errors in the market, relative deviation (RD). 7 Pooled across all markets and treatments, traders who made more safe than risky trades realized 52 percent greater market profits compared to traders who made more risky than safe trades. For each additional "net" safe rather than risky trade, market earnings were higher on average by 80 experimental dollars.
The adoption of safe and risky trading strategies by individual traders is correlated across markets, suggesting that the strategies employed are relatively stable as traders gain experience.
The correlation in traders' net number of safe rather than risky trades ranges between 0.40 and 0.76 when considered across any two adjacent markets in each treatment. This correlation is always significant, except in the Text treatment (two-tailed p-values are less than 0.03 in the other treatments, assessed using linear regressions with robust errors with session clustering). 
Conclusion
Our main finding is that passive participation significantly reduces bubble formation, similar to direct experience (i.e., active participation). While related work has found that experience mitigates bubbles, the mechanisms are unclear. Our results point to observation as a key mechanism, helping advance the literature beyond the simple conclusion that 'experience matters.' Recent work has also found positive effects for simulation based learning elsewhere, notably in financial investing (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 2013; Bradbury et al., 2014) .
Our second finding is that visual presentation of prices reduces mispricing for inexperienced and once-experienced traders. This suggests that visual representation of the price trend may improve understanding of the market and is consistent with related work that seeks to improve cognition through visual displays (Savikhin et al., 2011) .
The finding that passive participation reduces bubbles in a subsequent market deserves additional investigation. Our evidence suggests that the observation of a market price trend, 
